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4. A (non-)violent revolution? 




In an attempt to make sense of  our current political  conjuncture – 
 showing both signs of  crisis and political  invention –  many are starting 
to pay attention to the ascendance of  political practices echoing those of 
the 1871 Paris Commune: the occupation of  public spaces, the adoption 
of  direct democratic forms, attempts to organize social life according 
to principles of  association and cooperation, resistance to centralized 
government and a refusal to renounce an internationalist horizon (Ross, 
2015: pp. 1–9). Every now and then, it seems, political actors recover the 
‘lost treasure’ of  the revolutionary tradition. These are the new forms 
of  government that emerge during the course of  all great  revolutions 
–  popular organs that, as a result of  the concerted action of  citizens, con-
stitute spaces of  freedom beyond the purview of  the nation state (Arendt, 
2016 [1963]: pp. 215–81).
The recent work of Pierre Dardot (Chapter 2 in this volume) and 
Christian Laval relates to this context. As the subtitle of their latest book 
Commun: Essai sur la révolution au XXIe siècle reveals, they are engaged 
in a fundamental reassessment of the theory and practice of revolu-
tion (Dardot and Laval, 2014). Yet, they are equally suspicious of the 
grand schemes typical of nineteenth- and twentieth- century revolutionary 
thought, which tended to obscure or suppress the actual political and 
social revolutions taking place in the name of a ‘greater’ revolution- to- 
come. Following an incisive analysis of our current predicament that 
traces the extension of neoliberal reason to the different spheres of human 
existence, they set upon developing a political answer (Dardot and Laval, 
2009). Central to this book entitled La nouvelle raison du monde is the 
assertion that the neoliberal project is a ‘constructivist project’.2 Whereas 
classical liberalism works under the assumption that the propensity to 
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truck and barter is inherent to human nature, neoliberalism recognizes that 
economic rationality cannot be assumed as a natural given. Consequently, 
neoliberalism should not be seen as a politics that removes the obstacles to 
our natural inclination to truck and barter, but as a political project that 
stimulates market competition through permanent intervention. What 
Dardot and Laval are looking for, then, is a rival project that can counter-
act this neoliberal form of rationality. They are in search of an alternative 
to a rationality that reduces every issue of valuation to the simple question: 
does it enhance market competition or does it weaken it? This alterna-
tive reason they call the reason of the common (Dardot and Laval, 2009: 
pp. 457–81). To neoliberalism’s depoliticization of all spheres of society, 
they oppose a project for the democratization of all the important spheres 
of society (work, nature, culture and so on). To an individualist and 
competitive neoliberal subjectivity, they oppose a form of collectivity and 
solidarity. And, perhaps most importantly, to neoliberalism’s celebration 
of private property, they oppose a project of making the important spheres 
of human life non- appropriable. In the end, this is the baseline identified 
in Commun: what is important to human flourishing should never become 
a form of property.
It is important to emphasize that this new guiding principle should be 
political in nature. This means that they position themselves in opposition 
to two sets of literature. On the one hand, they counter the literature on the 
enclosure of the commons (for example, David Bollier and James Boyle) 
and common- pool resources (CPRs) (for example, Elinor Ostrom). On the 
other, they engage critically with a radical left literature on the common 
(for example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri). As opposed to the 
first set of literature, they maintain that it is more fruitful to speak of the 
principle of the common than of commons in the plural. The principle of 
the common, they argue, is expansive: generally speaking you can make 
any sphere of society operate according to the principle of the common. In 
contrast to this view, the literature on the enclosure of commons and CPRs 
assumes that commons are specific economic entities that either have to 
be defended against market and state, or live in harmony with market and 
state. In both cases the implications are potentially conservative: commons 
have a specific place in the socio- economic sphere and the borders with 
other economic or social entities should be maintained (Dardot and Laval, 
2014: pp. 95–187). Pace their radical leftist colleagues, they do not believe 
that political change will come forth from a specific social place or will be 
initiated by an already existing ‘universal’ class (Dardot et al., 2007). It 
might be the case that certain evolutions in the make- up of our economies 
are already realizing the principle of the common. We see it, for instance, 
in the way that Wikipedia makes encyclopaedic knowledge into a common. 
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However, economic tendencies, they argue, do not automatically translate 
into political projects. Hence, a collective political subject will have to be 
constructed and this requires political practices and institution- building. 
To be more precise, ‘common acting’ (agir commun) produces a collective 
subject, and not the other way around (Dardot and Laval, 2014: pp. 49–51, 
281–2).
This brings us to the issue at hand: the revolutionary change they envis-
age does not involve a violent conquest of the state. This old revolutionary 
recipe only ended up reproducing the forms of domination that it was 
supposed to abolish. In contrast, Dardot and Laval imagine an ‘auto- 
institution of society’ as practices of commoning more or less spontane-
ously proliferate in spite of and autonomously from the state, which, at some 
point, is transformed as a consequence of this expansion (Dardot and 
Laval, 2014: p. 575).3 However, this raises the question of what will happen 
when either state or capital see their authority or interests endangered. 
As Ramond Geuss argues,  revolutions –  as opposed to  reforms –  always 
imply a form of extra- legality. Sometimes revolutions are merely extra- 
constitutional or take place in a grey area of the law. But more structural 
transformations of society are often  illegal –  in which case they can be 
non- violent or violent (Geuss, 2006: p. 111).
Either way, every political project envisioning a fundamental transforma-
tion of society (even those willing to adopt the principle of non- violence) 
will at some point have to reflect on the relation between transformational 
politics and violence. Reflections on violence are a constant presence in 
Dardot and Laval’s Commun, which addresses the violence of primitive 
accumulation, statist domination and the systemic violence of the capital-
ist economic system. Nonetheless, a more systematic reflection on the 
relation between revolutionary politics and violence, we argue, is missing. 
To be more precise, we do not criticize them for proposing a non- violent 
revolution, but for not specifying why non- violence, as a revolutionary 
strategy, is preferable to violent ones.
This chapter will be structured as follows: in the first section (Section 2) 
we will determine which concept of politics is present in the revolutionary 
politics of Dardot and Laval and show that they cannot account for the 
relation between politics and violence. In particular, we will construct a 
brief  genealogy of the concept of political power inherent to the concept 
of the common. This is done in order to show how this concept of power 
makes the violence/non- violence dilemma disappear before it can rear its 
head. In the second section (Section 3) we sketch the dynamics of power 
and violence that result from a conflict between the state and the politics 
of the common. We do this in order to show that political violence is a 
problem that should be accounted for in the commons literature. In the 
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final section (Section 4), we explore the role violence can play and, more 
importantly, should not play in a revolutionary situation.
2.  THREE CONCEPTS OF POLITICS: 
EMANCIPATION, TRANSFORMATION AND 
CIVILITY
In order to grasp Dardot and Laval’s concept of revolution we have to 
determine which concept of  politics –  or, rather, political  change –  is 
implicit in their work. For ages political theorists have been bickering about 
the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of revolutionary political change and often the debate 
revolves around the question of which concept of politics to prioritize. Do 
we prioritize the struggle for rights? Or is it rather the recurrent attempt to 
seize the means of (re)production that moves history forward? Or maybe 
we should focus less on the ends of politics and more on the ways in which 
we relate to political means such as violence and coercion?
When we think about radical political change4 – Étienne Balibar 
 writes –  we cannot get by without at least three distinct concepts of 
politics: the politics of emancipation, the politics of transformation and 
the politics of civility (Balibar, 2002: p. 1). It is an open question whether 
this list is exhaustive, but at any rate one cannot study radical political 
change without having at least a notion of these three and their reciprocal 
interactions.
2.1  The Politics of Emancipation and the Politics of Transformation
The first concept of politics is that of the politics of emancipation, which 
is concerned with the expansion of human rights and the building of civic 
institutions. The idea that all men are ‘free and equal in rights’ resides 
at its core: any situation in which restrictions are imposed on liberty or 
equality (for example, when civil liberties are based on discrimination) is 
illegitimate (Balibar, 2002: p. 3). Hence, the main task of emancipatory 
politics is to build civic institutions that guarantee this equal liberty 
and give an institutional form to the idea that ‘all men are born free and 
equal’. However, as equal liberty is rarely ceded by those in power, conflict 
remains a decisive factor. That is, it is the ‘history  of  . . .  the real struggle 
to enjoy rights which have already been declared’ or ‘the battle against the 
denial of  citizenship’ that is the vital heart of  the politics of  emancipation 
(p. 6).
The politics of transformation, on the other hand, challenges one core 
assumption of the politics of emancipation: namely, that politics is a 
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wholly autonomous activity. Fundamentally, politics takes place in ‘non- 
political’ conditions that (over)determine it or, at the least, limit it. The 
boundaries separating the sphere of politics from other societal subsys-
tems are, to a certain extent, artificial. This explains why they can always 
be contested and why the ‘non- political’ conditions of political institutions 
are eminently political (p.  11). Accepting that oppression or inequality 
cannot always be sublated by the state, law or the rights of man, critical 
theorists such as Marx and Foucault have sought to show how important 
forms of political change often take place in the social, economic and 
cultural contextual conditions of politics (Balibar, 2015a: p. 10).
Dardot and Laval position their revolutionary politics on a terrain 
comprising these two concepts of politics. To be more precise, they 
present the politics of the common as a form of politics encompassing 
transformational politics and the politics of emancipation.5 The politics of 
the common, they argue, is ‘transversal to instituted separations’ (Dardot 
and Laval, 2014: p. 460). The political logic of democratic self- governance 
cannot be limited to the field of state politics or even the political sphere 
at large, but should also be extended to the social and economic sphere. 
This is why they argue that a revolution cannot be restricted  to –  yet 
should  include –  political institutions (in the form of ‘more rights’, or a 
‘greater inclusivity’), but should also transform the conditions in which 
politics takes place (p. 572). They envisage this revolutionary movement as 
‘moment of acceleration, intensification and collectivization of [the] insti-
tuting praxis [of “common acting”] in certain important areas of society’ 
(p. 575). As more and more areas of social life are made non- appropriable 
(inappropriable) through practices of commoning, a qualitative change 
takes place as state and market, public and private property, are finally 
subordinated to the principle of the common (p. 582).
As a result, they find themselves at odds with political thinkers who nar-
rowly circumscribe the sphere of politics in order to remove all social and 
economic questions from its domain. The problem with this reasoning, 
Dardot and Laval argue, is that it assumes that the sphere of the political is 
a given even though in a lot of cases social questions are political questions 
(p. 577). The governance of a natural resource, a workplace or a theatre all 
merit recognition as public affairs (pp. 463–5).
2.2  The Commons, Power and Violence
A third way to look at the problem of political change is to pay attention 
to political means such as force and violence, as opposed to the ends and 
objects of change. This particular point of view involves asking questions 
such as: can we force or coerce those not willing to participate in the 
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revolution? And: can we use violence in order to initiate the revolution 
or safeguard some of its achievements? In other words, it involves asking 
questions about the nature of (political) action, power and their relation to 
violence. These questions are central to the politics of civility (see infra).
If  we consider the politico- theoretical tradition in a schematic way, we 
can delineate at least two influential positions on the nature of political 
power and its relation to violence. On the one hand, we have thinkers like 
Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber, who conceive of power as power-over, 
that is, the ability of one person or group of persons to make others 
perform a specific action (whether or not this action is against the interest 
of the latter). In the words of Max Weber: power is ‘the probability that 
one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his 
own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this prob-
ability rests’ (Weber, 1978: p. 53). Consequently, violence, domination and 
coercion are treated as modalities of political action.6
On the other hand, we have another view, famously defended by Hannah 
Arendt which involves an understanding of power as power-with. Power 
comes into being only when people act in concert or when they engage in 
cooperation (Saar, 2010: pp. 9–12). Here, power is not something that a 
certain actor ‘has’ and exercises over others, but exists ‘in between’ people. 
In other words, power is relational as opposed to unilateral (Penta, 1996: 
p.  212). According to this conception of the political, violence appears 
as the opposite of power and politics. And this applies irrespective of 
whether violence manifests itself  in the form of legitimate or illegitimate 
domination, structural or subjective violence, revolutionary or counter- 
revolutionary violence. In short, violence appears as a form of anti- politics 
(Arendt, 1969; Frazer, 2014: p. 158).7
We argue that their quarrels with Arendt’s positions notwithstanding,8 
Dardot and Laval share her understanding of political action in this 
particular respect. First of all, they emphasize that a commons revolution 
would not be violent (Dardot and Laval, 2014: p.  575). Furthermore, 
significant parts of their book, Commun, are dedicated to analyses of 
the internal workings of the politics of the common, all of which end up 
stressing their cooperative and deliberative aspects (for example, Dardot 
and Laval, 2014: pp. 280–83, 445, 578–82). Violence, on the other hand, 
is something that is done to the commons. They were captured by socialist 
states and subjected to the structural violence of bureaucracies (pp. 79–85); 
they were enclosed in violent episodes of primitive accumulation (pp. 120–
24); and, increasingly, we are seeing the echoes of these different forms 
of violence (pp. 98–119), while new forms of dispossession attest to the 
structural violence that is inherent in the workings of globalized financial 
markets (pp. 127–31).
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This view, we would add, is not entirely accidental. In the different 
intellectual origins of their concept of the common, we see a similar 
understanding of the nature of power.9 Take, for instance, the work of 
Elinor Ostrom. If  we look at her writings, it quickly becomes apparent 
that she is partisan to the notion of ‘power- with’. Her research on CPRs, 
she argues, challenges ‘the Hobbesian conclusion that the constitution 
of order is only possible by creating sovereigns who then must govern by 
being above subjects, monitoring them, and by imposing sanctions on all 
who would otherwise not comply’ (Ostrom et al., 1992: p. 414). In other 
words, people can cooperate and keep credible commitments without there 
being an external enforcer. This means that, in commons, power does not 
rest in an external institution or a centralized authority with the ability to 
impose and enforce rules of action (Ostrom, 2000). It exists in between 
people in a horizontal contract they conclude among themselves and keep 
alive through communication and their shared action.
Although this brief  outline already shows how coercion and violence 
are unassimilable to Ostrom’s concept of power in commons, we do have 
to acknowledge that political and social revolutions were never one of 
her concerns. It is important, then, to point out that the same applies to 
Dardot and Laval’s more radical and explicitly anticapitalistic  influences 
–  a tradition of theorizing worker’s self- management that has its roots 
in the work of Pierre- Joseph Proudhon and was further developed in 
the writings of Marcel Mauss (Dardot and Laval, 2014: pp.  367–403). 
Proudhon is equally critical of the concept of ‘power- over’. To be more 
precise, Proudhon opposes something he calls collective force to political 
power. In his own words, ‘[t]he problem consists, then, for the working 
classes, not in capturing, but in defeating both power and monopoly’ (cited 
in Allen, 1952: p. 5). The concept of political power refers to every form or 
instrument of  domination –  the state, police, workplace hierarchies and so 
on. It can, in other words, be equated with all forms of ‘power- over’. On 
the other hand, Proudhon’s own concept of the institution of collective 
force can, perhaps somewhat confusingly, be seen as a form of ‘power- 
with’. It is a form of collective, shared power that is immanent to workers’ 
self- organization. Taken together this adds up to a specific concept of 
revolution: a revolution takes place as these practices of self- organization 
spread, realizing a form of social justice in more and more parts of society. 
As this form of ‘power- with’ is extended, it will prevail over a state that 
has become useless (Dardot and Laval, 2014: p. 367). Put differently, as 
practices of workers’ self- organization spread, all forms and instruments 
of domination, having become obsolete, will wither away. This revolution, 
consequently, takes place without force or violence being exercised (Solari, 
2012: p. 229). Proudhon’s revolution was to be non- violent: a survey of his 
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positions during the 1848 revolutions shows that he opposed violence and 
force against the government at every point (Allen, 1952: pp. 3–9).
To be clear, this view on the nature of power has its merits (see: 
Bernstein, 2013: pp. 78–104). It remains the task of every emancipatory 
political project to challenge those political imaginaries that unreflexively 
equate politics with force and violence. However, its particular take on the 
relation (or, rather, non- relation) between political change and violence 
is problematic. For instance, it is not very clear whether the oppositions 
that are established in such a  view –  between dialogical cooperation and 
mute violence, or being- with- others and the domination of  others –  can 
always be upheld.10 This is especially the case in revolutionary situations 
as temporal pressures and the opposition of fellow citizens work together 
to undermine cooperative politics (Breen, 2012: pp. 144–50). The problem 
with this position, however, is not that it presents a non- violent version of 
radical political change. What is problematic is the implicit assumption 
that political change and non- violent change are identical. Non- violence 
is no longer a strategy, but is simply inherent to the nature of the political.
We do not believe, however, that this is a tenable position. It is not 
possible to strictly separate politics and violence. This brings us into the 
realm of Balibar’s third concept of politics: the politics of civility. All 
forms of radical politics, as he argues, face a tragic dilemma: we ‘need 
to politically transform the existing state of  things –  characterized by 
structural and circumstantial  violence –  though we can renounce neither 
the struggle for emancipation nor resistance (interior or exterior) to the 
nihilism of violence’ (Balibar, 2009: p. 11). There is always a risk that, in the 
face of oppression, a revolt or a revolution turns into destructive or self- 
destructive counter- violence (p. 29). The tragic character of political action 
consists in the fact that it can never completely divest itself  of the different 
forms of violence, but once this violence gets out of control (that is, turns 
into extreme violence or cruelty) politics is made impossible as the shared 
political space collapses under the weight of hostilities. Once this happens, 
the conditions for political action to occur disappear  and –  perhaps more 
significant for a politics of transformation –so does the possibility of a 
truly political conflict (Balibar, 2015b: p. 47).
This involves an important perspectival shift: instead of opposing poli-
tics to violence in general, it opposes politics to a type of  violence –  namely, 
cruelty. Cruelty is that kind of violence that can never be converted into a 
form of political change. Cruelty is an extreme form of violence that severs 
all  relations –  of communication as well as  conflict –  between opposing 
political groups. But political violence is not reducible to cruelty and as 
a consequence political violence is not to be condemned a priori. Instead 
what is opened up is a realm of political action in which an active choice 
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has to be made between different political strategies, some of which involve 
violence and others of which adhere to non- violence. These are what 
Balibar calls strategies of civility: they intervene in the politics of eman-
cipation and transformation in order to prevent them from slipping into 
anti- politics (or cruelty) (Balibar, 2015a: p. 51). In this particular respect, 
Balibar’s thought is deeply Weberian: it is not impossible that the limited 
exercise of violence might prevent a far worse violence. Consequently, 
resistant actors need to develop a political ethic that is appropriate to this 
tragic nature of political action. They have to cultivate a political sensibil-
ity appropriate to a world that often is violent, meaning that they have to 
learn when to avoid violence, but  also –  if   necessary –  when to resort to 
violence (Balibar, 2009: pp. 28–9).
We argue that Commun is lacking such a perspective precisely because it 
(a) analytically separates the concept of political action from that of vio-
lence and (b) overemphasizes the cooperative nature of the politics of the 
common.11 What is missing in this account is an appraisal of the different 
ways in which resistance to forms of  violence –  for example, in the form of 
a confrontation between the politics of the common and the authority of 
 state –  inserts the politics of the common into a dynamic of violence that 
it can neither evade nor control. In the following section we will sketch this 
dynamic of violence between state and the politics of the common. We do 
this in order to show why the problem of civility is a concrete problem for 
the politics of the common.
3.  AS THE COMMON CONFRONTS THE STATE: 
THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
The politics of the common presents a challenge to state authority in many 
ways, but the mutual exclusivity of modern constitutionalism and the ‘law 
of the commons’12 is probably the clearest manifestation of such a chal-
lenge (see also Part III of this volume). The modern, Western tradition of 
law ascribes a fundamental importance to state sovereignty, public property 
and private property, and is therefore fundamentally irreconcilable with the 
law of the common (Dardot and Laval, 2014: p. 467; Bailey and Marcucci, 
2013: p.  973; Broumas, 2015: p.  14) (see also Mattei, Chapter 10 in this 
volume). For instance, whereas the law of the common refuses to appoint a 
proprietor of the common (the common is inappropriable and, thus, cannot 
belong to anyone), the Western tradition cannot conceive of a common 
without an owner (Dardot and Laval, 2014: p. 470; Broumas, 2015: p. 18).13
Should these legal orders clash at some point, different scenarios are 
conceivable. First, we could witness an illegalization of practices of 
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 commoning. States have an interest in preventing these new ways of organ-
izing common life from stabilizing into new institutions, so they could 
prohibit them. They are, for instance, already doing this by tightening 
anti- squatting laws (Vishmidt, 2014).14 A continuation of these practices 
in the face of their illegalization could have the effect of reinforcing state 
authority. As Hans Lindahl notes, even though illegal behaviour ‘breaches 
legal order, its qualification as illegal has a “positive” normative signifi-
cance: illegality counts as the privative manifestation of legal order, hence 
as its reaffirmation’ (Lindahl, 2013: p. 28). As long as these confrontations 
between commoners and the state are relatively rare and the community 
of citizens recognizes the illegality of the commoners’ acts, the state is 
‘justified’ if  it responds to resistance with violence.
A second, contrasting scenario would see the incorporation of practices 
of commoning into the legal order of the state. One example is the occupa-
tion of the Teatro Valle in  Rome –  demanding that culture be recognized 
as a common  good –  and its subsequent legalization. Whereas the initial 
occupation of the Teatro was illegal, the occupants managed to get legal 
recognition for the occupation through the employment of a private law 
tool (Bailey and Marcucci, 2013: p. 399). The problem with this strategy, 
however, is that it only works insofar as state authority is not fundamentally 
threatened. Once the state notices that legal(ized) practices of commoning 
threaten its authority, it might impose additional legal measures. For 
instance, new legal demands were imposed on the Teatro Valle threatening 
to hinder its operation (Vishmidt, 2014; Dardot and Laval, 2014: p. 479).
A third scenario, we argue, coincides with what Dardot and Laval call 
the auto- institution of society: in this case practices of commoning would 
be so widespread and normatively pertinent that they actually challenge 
the distinction between legality and illegality. They would constitute 
what Hans Lindhal calls, a form of a-legal behaviour ‘that deplete[s] the 
normativity of a legal order’ as it reveals how this same legal order closes 
down on the possibility of acting in ways that ‘claim a normative force of 
their own’ (Lindahl, 2013: p. 36). For example: commoners might breach 
property laws, but at the same time their practices of sharing claim a nor-
mative force of their own. Accordingly, they compel us to question certain 
normative distinctions inherent to the regulation of property as codified in 
the legal order.
In the end, most revolutions end up re- enacting scenes of all three 
scenarios: the fragile beginnings that are in danger of being suppressed, the 
recurring risk of co- optation, but also the possibility of becoming a true 
event  that –  if  only for a  moment –  upends our conceptions of what is and 
is not politically feasible. The challenge for commoners exists in getting 
from scenario  one –  the fragile  beginnings –  to scenario  three –  the start of 
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a revolutionary  transition –  without succumbing to state violence. As some 
theorists have already noted, it is naïve to think that practices that chal-
lenge the state as a unity of power (even in cases where this challenge is not 
explicit) will not elicit a violent response. The fact that states are nowadays 
increasingly losing power due to processes of globalization and decentrali-
zation does not curb this tendency. On the contrary, in order to maintain 
the illusion of the unity of power they resort to visible supplements to 
whatever power they still have, and state violence seemingly provides such 
a supplement (Balibar, 2015b: pp. 38–42; Jameson, 2016: p. 4).
Another factor to take into account is that state  violence –  as Johanna 
Oksala  argues –  is inherent to neoliberal governmentality. As we already 
argued in the introduction, neoliberalism is a constructivist  project –  it 
is a project that recognizes its own artificiality. Market competition is 
never taken as a natural given, but is something that has to be brought 
into existence through ‘permanent vigilance, activity and intervention’ 
(Oksala, 2012: p. 140). State violence is one of the means through which 
market competition is created and secured. This explains why practices 
of commoning that are not co- optable are met with violence. As Oksala 
notes, ‘[t]he violent suppression of such activism in Western democratic 
states must be seen not only as an attempt to protect private  property – 
 effective policing of the economic  game –  but also as an attempt to close 
off  possibilities for opting out of it’ (p. 141). In these cases violence is not 
merely restrictive, but also productive of subjectivity (p. 105). That is to 
say, state violence does not only protect private property, but also guards 
the boundaries of political and social reality: it establishes which ways of 
living are acceptable, and which ones are not.15
In this context, resistance to a  state –  whether it presents itself  as 
insubordination, revolution or  subversion –  might initiate a cycle of 
violence. The political problem that this dynamic poses, forces resistant or 
revolutionary actors to develop strategies that would allow them to further 
their resistance or revolution  while –  at the same  time –  resisting the logic 
of the escalation of violence.
4.  THE COMMON(S) AND STRATEGIES OF 
CIVILITY
In this last section, we will explore the role that violence could play in 
the revolutionary politics of the common.16 The problem that we should 
tackle, then, is that violence and democracy, which is central to the defini-
tion of the common, are generally seen to be opposites. Violence, or ‘the 
use of considerable force or destroying force against people or things’ 
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(Honderich, 1980: p. 153), is deemed to be incompatible with uncoerced, 
egalitarian and autonomous democratic decision- making.17 This same 
argument would also be relevant for Dardot and Laval. Democracy, as 
Dardot defines it, can be characterized as ‘co- participation in public 
affairs’ and ‘self- government’ (see Dardot, Chapter 2 in this volume). 
Violence seemingly does not fit into this picture.
Nonetheless, political violence could enter the scene in roughly two 
kinds of situations: either, when the logic of the common is extended 
through the strategic or non-strategic use of violence, or, when practices of 
commoning have to be defended against hostile actors.
4.1  Extending the Logic of the Common through Violence
Regarding the first kind of situation, we would adhere to Dardot and 
Laval’s reluctance towards the strategic use of violence in pursuit of long- 
term political and economic goals (for example, Dardot and Laval, 2014: 
pp.  84, 451). The instrumentalization of violence is not an appropriate 
strategy for a democratic commons revolution. For one, as Howard Caygill 
points out, there is a tension between ‘the political control of violence, and 
the inherent tendency of violence to escalate beyond such control’ (Caygill, 
2013: p. 81). Violence is nothing like an instrument. It is part of a complex 
set of dynamics that cannot be controlled by its perpetrators. Although 
violence might help to achieve certain short- term goals, its unpredictable 
consequences tend to overwhelm long- term goals (Frazer and Hutchings, 
2008: p. 103).
More importantly, violence is not only too unpredictable to be instru-
mentalized, it also has a bearing on the subjectivity of those that exercise 
it. The dynamics of violence, once unleashed, do not only play out in the 
physical realm, but also in the realm of imaginary representations. Images 
of enmity, destruction or conspiracy capture the subjectivity of political 
actors and consequently introduce forms of cruelty in what was once a 
political conflict (Balibar, 2015a: pp.  105–6). Of course, one  could –  as 
Georges Sorel  does –  celebrate violence’s function as an accelerator of social 
divisions (Sorel, 1961 [1908]). In order to understand Sorel’s perception of 
revolutionary violence, we have to comprehend his political voluntarism. 
Orthodox Marxists believe class antagonism derives automatically from 
an objective conflict in social  reality –  the conflict of interests between the 
proletariat and the capitalist class. Sorel, on the other hand, recognizes 
that this objective conflict does not translate mechanically into a subjective 
conflict. Class consciousness is not produced by the objective existence 
of classes, but has to be created politically and ideologically (Ciccariello- 
Maher, 2017: pp. 28–33). Violence, then, plays a role in the creation and 
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delimitation of class consciousness. To be clear, Sorel does not believe 
that violence has a purely instrumental function: it should not be put to 
use in order to implement utopian plans. On the contrary, Sorel despises 
the figure of the Jacobin: the revolutionary who claims to have uncovered 
a moral truth or the laws of history and intends to implement this truth 
through the use of force and violence (Ibid.: pp. 26, 36). Instead, violence 
has the function of unifying the working class, on the one hand, and the 
bourgeoisie, on the other. Violence polarizes and, as a result, clarifies the 
lines of conflict. Moreover, it provokes the state in the hope of revealing 
its true face as its repressive function becomes apparent. Consequently, 
violence neither has a strategical function, it is not put to use as a means to 
achieve long- term goals, nor does it necessarily have a tactical function, it 
is not used to break the enemy’s will in a specific situation. Violence, rather, 
has a theatrical function: it provides the proletariat with a narrative that 
motivates and orientates (Finlay, 2009: p. 32).
Would this form of violence, drastically stripped of the illusion of its 
controllability, be more appropriate to a commons revolution? As Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argue, Sorel’s thinking provides a welcome 
antidote to a form of economic determinism that completely eliminates 
the factor of political will (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014 [1985]: pp. 30–36). 
In this sense, it fits nicely with Dardot and Laval’s project of breaking 
with the determinist tendencies present in some theories of the common 
(see Section 1). On the other hand, however, we believe this approach to 
violence would be problematic for two interrelated reasons. For one, it 
puts the horse before the cart. Sorel was, of course, rightfully critical of 
revolutionaries that put violence in service of a political project. However, 
in turn, he made the opposite mistake of assuming that, once violence 
performed its polarizing function, the contours of a proletarian political 
project would materialize. As Elisabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings 
argue, Sorel upholds ‘an ethic of struggle in which fighting well is more 
important than being able definitively to articulate the substance of what 
you are fighting for’ (Frazer and Hutchings, 2009: p.  57). This seems 
like a problematic stance to say the least. Although antagonism plays an 
important part in any revolution, the real basis of its power is its creative 
 energy –  the fact that a political experiment is taking place. While this does 
not mean that one has to have a political blueprint at hand, eventually 
a political  project –  the substance of what you are fighting  for –  should 
emerge from these revolutionary practices and the debates surrounding it.
A second problem, as Sorel’s own discourse already shows, is that this 
position involves a shift from political action to acts of  war (Sorel, 1961 
[1908]: 115). Sorel essentially depoliticizes both violence and revolution: 
violence is meant to sever all political and ethical relations between the 
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proletariat and the capitalist class (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014 [1985]: p. 33; 
Frazer and Hutchings, 2009). As Balibar points out, this is the paradox 
that any attempt to equate class struggle to civil war produces: on the one 
hand, civil war appears as the condition of possibility of  politics: without 
it a radically new form of politics can never emerge. But on the other 
hand, it becomes a condition of impossibility of  politics as the political 
space, where communication and conflict between opponents can emerge, 
collapses (Balibar, 2017: p. 164). Hence, also in this respect the Sorelian 
account of  violence falls short of  the politics of  the common. As Dardot 
and Laval stress at multiple points in their argument, the politics of  the 
common always require a self- alteration of  the political actors involved. 
Commoners change themselves as they change the world around them. 
They develop certain habits, patterns of  action and a form of self- 
understanding appropriate to democratic acting- in- common (Dardot and 
Laval, 2014: pp.  436–45). However, this also applies to violent political 
action. The problem then is that violence could negatively affect the 
actors’ subjectivity. Violence, as John Kean succinctly puts it, ‘kills off  
the potential democrat in both the violator and violated’ (Kean, 2004: 
p.  156). A form of extreme, antagonistic violence would, eventually, 
form an obstacle to the universalization of  the logic of  the common as 
political  relations are dissolved into absolute divisions between warring 
factions.
4.2  Defending the Logic of the Common through Violence
Whether this aversion towards political violence can be upheld in situa-
tions where democratic commons have to be defended, however, remains 
in question. When it comes to this matter, Dardot and Laval’s position is 
not entirely clear. As we already noted, their main focus lies on socialist 
cooperative practices (associations in French) – their democratic nature, 
practices of sharing, the institution of rules of cooperation and their 
pedagogical function (Dardot and Laval, 2014: pp.  391–403, 497–505). 
Be that as it may, their discourse on the defence of these associations 
is couched in terms that suggest conflict (for example, the language of 
struggles or resistance (pp. 484, 501)), but do not confront the question of 
violence head- on. However, practices of commoning often (if  not always) 
find themselves in situations defined by particular forms of violence they 
cannot simply subtract themselves from. We will thus have to find a way 
to navigate the paradox of civil violence, which consists in the fact that 
there are ‘times and  circumstances . . .  when violence functions as a basic, 
if  highly paradoxical, precondition of the pursuit or preservation of a civil 
democracy’ (Kean, 2004: p. 139).
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Applied to the specific subject at hand, this might mean that in order 
to distance themselves from the state, networks of commons will have to 
find ways to undermine its monopoly of violence. For instance, there may 
be specific cases in which political violence is warranted to the extent that 
it helps ‘defend the  spaces . . .  opened up for non- violent political action 
from the forces trying to suppress or destroy them’ (Finlay, 2009: p. 37). 
Throughout the history of cooperative practices we can find multiple 
instances of this phenomenon. Take, for instance, the Paris Commune 
of 1871: as Martin Breaugh confirms, the living heart of the Commune 
were the clubs and societies that operated according to the principle 
of association and constituted a veritable alternative to state power 
(Breaugh, 2007: pp. 364–74). Still, violence was not entirely missing from 
this picture. While physical violence may have been rare and was seldom 
gratuitously employed, verbal and symbolic violence were less so. These 
different forms of violence and the potential threat of physical violence 
created an atmosphere in which opponents of the Commune where more 
wary of intervening (pp. 296–7). Still, we all know what happened to the 
Commune: it ended up being violently repressed.
This is why it is worth considering a more contemporary example, which 
Dardot and Laval refer to as well (Bauwens, 2016): Rojava, also known as 
the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. Rojava is an autonomous 
region in the northern part of Syria that consists of three self- governing 
cantons: Afrin, Jazira and Kobani. What makes this political entity so 
extraordinary is the fact that it  approximates –  although  imperfectly –  what 
we take to be a federation of commons. It is organized according to the 
principles of direct democracy, democratic confederalism, economic and 
social life are democratized, and ecological principles are central to the 
organization of their society. Last, but certainly not least, it organizes 
society in a way that continuously defends ‘itself  against the emergence of 
centralized power and state- ness’ (Üstündağ, 2016: p. 199). In other words, 
it consciously subverts the process of nation state formation.
This radical experiment, however, takes place in circumstances that are 
hostile to say the least. On the one hand, Rojava has to deal with a Turkish 
state, which is determined to suppress Kurdish autonomy. On the other 
hand, it is constantly on the defence against Islamist organizations such 
as al- Nuzra and ISIS seeking to extend their territory (pp. 197 and 205). 
This implies that Rojava is confronted with the paradox that we outlined 
above, having to defend their achievements against hostile forces, without 
abandoning their principles. The practical solution that the Rojavans 
developed in response is fascinating. Instead of organizing their resistance 
in response to the violence/non- violence dilemma, they posed the problem 
as a choice between the monopolization of violence, on the one hand, and 
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the democratization of violence, on the other. If  the choice between vio-
lence and non- violence is not an option, then the organization of a defence 
against reactionary violence should be democratic to its core. Nazan 
Üstündağ describes how this plays out in the day- to- day reality of Rojava: 
‘[the] self- defence of women requires’, she writes, ‘that women and men 
participate equally in all formations, institutions, economies, and leader-
ship positions’. In addition, all institutions must give women and youth the 
right to veto any decision affecting them so that they can defend themselves 
against the corruption of the men and the elderly (pp. 199–200). In other 
words, there are mechanisms in place that prevent the monopolization of 
violence in the hands of the few.
What is admirable about the Rojava case is that it proves new, democratic 
forms of life can be built despite the context of an armed struggle. Hence, 
we should not succumb to the allure of military heroism. As Michael 
Hardt and Toni Negri forcefully argue, the only proper way to judge the 
efficacy of the weapons of self- defence is to judge them ‘first and foremost 
for how they serve the constructive struggle [of] creating and  maintaining 
. . .  new forms of life’ (Hardt and Negri, 2017: p. 271). Moreover, different 
contexts require different weapons. Strategies of guerrilla warfare are 
out of place in our Western, liberal democracies. In this context, violence 
might be more limited and geared towards protecting people from police 
violence or the violence of far- right movements. The main lesson that 
Rojava teaches, then, is that while violence might play a role in the defence 
of what are sometimes fragile, new forms of life, it should not overtake 
them. This intricate balancing act should be at the centre of a democratic 
revolution of the common.
5.  CONCLUSION
In order to restate our argument, let us return to what are ultimately the 
stakes of the revolution of the common: proposing an alternative to a 
dominant neoliberal governmentality. Leaving its devastating effects to the 
side for a moment, what is so problematic about this neoliberal rationality 
is that it presents serious obstacles to resistant and revolutionary actors. 
Neoliberal forms of subjectification, for instance, isolate citizens from 
each other as competition becomes the organizing principle of society. 
Isolation and competition, in turn, prevent forms of solidarity from 
emerging. In the striking formulation of Alex Williams, we are living in 
a time of negative solidarity: not merely the absence of solidarity, but 
an active resentment towards those willing to act collectively in order to 
demand a form of justice. If  I truly believe that better living conditions or 
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better working conditions should be the result of personal achievement, 
then collective action can only be seen as spoiling the party. And if  I am 
willing to endure hardship because I know that one day I will succeed, 
then others must do so too (instead of wanting to change the rules of the 
game through collective action) (Williams, 2010). In this sense, Dardot and 
Laval’s principle of the common responds to the root of the problem: if  
competition between isolated actors is the organizing principle of society, 
then learning to act in common is the first and foremost task of a revolu-
tionary politics. Commoning is not only an alternative way of organizing 
economic and social life, it is also a pedagogic project that teaches people 
how to resist neoliberal subjectivity.
We believe this context partly explains Dardot and Laval’s theoretical 
positions. If  we have to overcome a rationality that opposes people to each 
other as competitors and does not have a concept of the common good, 
then cooperating to reach a common goal becomes a form of resistance 
in itself. Moreover, if  we do not want to repeat the mistakes of past revo-
lutionary movements that ended up in authoritarian regimes, we have to 
develop an alternative conception of power. This is why Dardot and Laval 
reach back to a leftist tradition of cooperative, non- authoritarian political 
and social thinking. We agree with Dardot and Laval that the insights of 
this tradition are absolutely indispensable. However, as our short geneal-
ogy of the concept of power in this tradition shows, the unintended result 
is that questions of revolutionary violence and force stop being posed. As 
a result, an alternative leftist tradition that sees politics in terms of radical 
antagonism and division is left to the side.18
However, resistance to our contemporary neoliberal states will eventu-
ally impose exactly these kinds of questions. History has shown that 
states do not take kindly to movements that challenge their authority and 
neoliberal states will likewise respond with violence. Resistance and revolu-
tions unfold in situations that ask of political actors to consider different 
strategies of civility, some of which are violent and some of which are not. 
And as we maintained in the last section, while non- violence might be a 
valid strategy, so are certain forms of defensive violence. At times these 
forms of self- defence might be the only way in which a radical political 
experiment can be sustained.
NOTES
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 1. As Wendy Brown, who coined the idea, explains: ‘Neoliberalism is a constructivist 
project: it does not presume the ontological givenness of a thoroughgoing economic 
rationality for all domains of society but rather takes as its task the development, 
dissemination, and institutionalization of such a rationality’ (Brown, 2005: pp. 40–41). 
These ideas essentially go back to the work of Michel Foucault (Burchell et al., 2008).
 2. Since this chapter is mainly focused on the relation between practices of commoning 
and the state, it might give the impression that the revolution of the common should 
be restricted to the national level. We would like to make clear that this is definitely 
not the case. First, Dardot and Laval themselves emphasize that the revolution of the 
common will be a global and ‘cosmopolitical’ revolution (Dardot and Laval, 2014; also 
see Chapter 2 in this volume). Second, global governance is a necessary component of 
neoliberal governmentality. It is impossible to clearly separate neoliberal governmental-
ity on a national level and neoliberal governmentality on the transnational and global 
levels. (I would like to thank Samuel Cogolati for highlighting this crucial point.) 
However, we do believe that there are good reasons to focus on the relation between the 
common and the nation state. The most important one being that this is a chapter about 
violence and, as of now, nation states still have a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of 
violence. It is possible that nation states will at some point lose this monopoly, or that 
this monopoly will be transformed. However, we believe that this will ultimately not 
affect our argument.
 3. We leave the definition of ‘radical political change’ relatively open. The adjective ‘radical’ 
merely expresses a difference with political change that takes place within the confines of 
the status quo (for example, a change of government or a new law being passed).
 4. This accentuation of the importance of the social revolution and a critical attitude 
towards a specific take on political revolutions (defined as attempts to ‘seize power’) is 
typical of most commons literature (see, for example, De Angelis, 2014).
 5. The very fact that they are seen as modalities of  political action, does not imply that 
violence and coercion are always legitimate forms of political action.
 6. Another way to look at the commons literature in relation to the question of power is 
to work with the pairings ‘power- to’ and ‘power- over’, on the one hand, and ‘potential’ 
and ‘potesta’, on the other (Van de Sande, 2017). However, this leads to slightly different 
stakes: here, the question of violence gives way to the question of the ontological rela-
tion between the common and the social and political structures it struggles against. The 
question then becomes: are commons internal to these structures or are they, or do they 
become, external to them?
 7. Dardot and Laval are influenced by Arendt’s work on the council system, but disap-
prove of her strict separation between the political and the social. For Arendt the 
council system is a purely political innovation, whereas for Dardot and Laval its novelty 
consists in the merging of the political and the social (Dardot and Laval, 2014: p. 401).
 8. We do have to add that Dardot and Laval appropriate these influences in a critical way. 
In the case of Elinor Ostrom they build on her institutional analysis, but take her to 
task for restricting the logic of the common to a specific place in society. That is to say, 
they criticize her because  Ostrom –  as an economic  pluralist –  thinks that the commons 
could live peacefully beside the state and the market (as opposed to becoming a rival 
logic) (Dardot and Laval, 2014: pp. 155–7). In the case of Proudhon, they point out that 
he insists too much on the social and apolitical logic of worker’s self- organization. In 
contrast, Dardot and Laval contend that these forms of self- organization are political 
through and through (something which the later Proudhon came to accept as well) 
(p. 382).
 9. There exists, for instance, a literature exploring the relation between non- violence and 
authoritarianism. A strict adherence to non- violence can lead to the emergence of 
hierarchies where some come to occupy a place of moral authority that allows them to 
police the behaviour of others (Frazer, 2016: pp. 5–6).
10. There is, as Martin Deleixhe has argued, also an internal aspect to this assertion: that 
is, underlining the cooperative aspect of the politics of the common also distracts from 
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the internal conflicts that either already exist or may arise. As a result, different forms 
of domination in commons (for example, women bearing the brunt of the labour in 
commons) disappear from view (Deleixhe, 2018).
11. There is a clear tendency in the literature on the commons to emphasize the need for 
a new paradigm of legality. The assumption being that there are some elements in the 
tradition of modern constitutionalism (for example, the importance of property rights, 
the legal enshrinement of a particular form of representative democracy and so on) that 
conflict with the principles that inhere in practices of commoning. That is why most of 
these thinkers develop some version of an alternative law of or for the common(s).
12. However, this does not mean that we should reduce this conflict to its strictly legal terms. 
A legal order is always more than a set of rules: it entails specific forms of subjectivity 
and norms that shape the practices of those subject to them.
13. It should be noted that not all forms of squatting are automatically acts of commoning. 
Squatting becomes an act of commoning when the right of  use –  in the form of a right 
to have a roof over one’s  head –  is opposed to the right to property. Another important 
factor is that the squatters/commoners autonomously and democratically develop rules 
that regulate this right of usage.
14. And this is still leaving out the factor of race, a question about which Dardot and 
 Laval –  focused on a more traditional, white labouring  class –  have little to say. Should 
the logic of the common become universal, it will have to develop a more expansive 
concept of the working class. Hence, it will have to include a population that, often 
due to the factor of race, lives on the borders between the proletarian condition and 
that of the lumpenproletariat. However, this surplus population, as became evident 
in the twentieth- and twenty- first- century race riots, is more intensely caught up in a 
relation with state violence (see: Clover, 2016: pp. 130–92). A proper consideration of 
the relation between the common(s) and race, however, would take more space that this 
chapter can offer. For two important takes on the subject see: Harney and Moten, 2013; 
and Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: pp. 277–312.
15. Of course, as we argued above, the set of strategies of civility also includes non- violent 
strategies. However, within the limits of this chapter it is not possible to cover both 
violent and non- violent strategies in depth. Since non- violent strategies have been at the 
centre of the commons literature, it seemed more appropriate to shed some light on a 
topic that is less written about in relation to the common(s).
16. Even, as John Medearis notes, in its more radical and oppositional forms (Medearis, 
2015: p.148).
17. This is not to suggest that there can be no overlap between these two traditions. The 
most interesting political positions are the ones that balance the two traditions.
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